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The Patient Assistance Problem
John DeFuria*

Introduction
Prescription drug prices and rising healthcare costs in the United States continue to be a topic
of controversy as drug manufacturers, governments, insurance companies and patients battle over
who to blame for high drug prices. 1 Due to increasingly high healthcare costs, the reality of how
insurance companies cover the cost of prescription medicines has left many Americans
“functionally uninsured” meaning that their health insurance either does not cover certain
medications or requires them to pay out-of-pocket costs that they simply cannot afford. 2 Patient
Assistance Programs (“PAPs”) serve as an important safety net for the many Americans who do
not have insurance or whose insurance does not sufficiently cover the costs of their medications. 3
PAPs come in various forms and facilitate patient access to prescription drugs by providing
financially needy patients with cash subsidies and co-pay assistance.4 At first glance, relieving the
financial burdens that would otherwise keep patients from accessing life-saving medications
appears to be a reasonable solution. 5 However, from a broader perspective, it might not do
anything to address the underlying reasons why these financial burdens exist in the first place, and
a flood of recent enforcement actions by the Department of Justice targeting PAPs have led to
increased scrutiny in the area.6 Many question the long-term sustainability of the current patient
financial assistance model, and wonder if PAPs are merely a Band-Aid trying to fix a much larger
problem.7
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In order to begin analyzing the potential issues, it is important to take a closer look at the
pharmaceutical industry as a whole. The United States biopharmaceutical industry is the largest
in the world, and U.S. firms conduct over half of the world’s pharmaceutical research and
development spending.8 The pharmaceutical industry often appears on lists of the most profitable
industries;” the massive profits often associated with pharmaceutical companies are made possible,
however, because of the patent protection granted to new drug discoveries.9 The pharmaceutical
industry is research and development-driven with manufacturers investing millions of dollars and
incurring significant expenses with hopes of developing a “blockbuster” drug. 10 A successful drug
discovery can generate exponential profits, but the high upfront costs and level of uncertainty
create a risky investment, leaving investors seeking high potential returns to offset the risk. 11 Once
a drug is developed, marginal manufacturing costs are relatively low, which makes patent
protection necessary to justify the research and development costs. 12 Without patents,
manufacturers would be able to produce drugs at minimal prices; there would be no incentive,
however, for pharmaceutical companies to take the risk and invest in the creation of new drugs if
there was no prospect of high returns.13 This would create a potentially devastating impact on
future medical progress as research and development investing would be left to public funding. 14
This comment will provide a comprehensive overview of the pharmaceutical industry and
illustrate the role that PAPs play in the prescription drug pricing crisis. Part I will look at the
economic factors that drive the prescription drug market, provide a basic overview of the
pharmaceutical supply chain as drugs move from manufacturer to patient, and the financial
relationship between different key players. Part II will introduce the various types of PAPs and
explain how they play a role in facilitating patient’s access to prescription drugs. Part III will
describe the potential for fraud presented by PAPs, address guidance provided by the Office of the
Inspector General and summarize recent enforcement actions related to PAPs. Next, Part IV will
briefly cover recent government enforcement action related to PAPs. Part V will utilize data to
illustrate the problem created by PAPs, how they affect prescription drug spending, and who is
hurt by the cost-implications of this system. Part VI will summarize recent state legislation
regarding limiting PAPs in order to lower prescription drug prices, and why these laws fell short.
Finally, Part VII will use an example of a recent federal legislative proposal to analyze the
challenges presented in creating federal healthcare legislation.
I.

The Pharmaceutical Industry at a Glance

The United States pharmaceutical industry is extremely complex and includes many more
market participants beyond simply manufacturers and consumers.15 The United States
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pharmaceutical supply chain is “multi-faceted” and the process in which drugs travel to patients
includes a number of “stakeholders.” 16 The key players in the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain
include pharmaceutical manufacturers, wholesale distributors, pharmacies, and Pharmacy Benefit
Managers (“PBMs”).17 The complex chain from manufacturer to consumer in conjunction with
heavy government regulation leads to a complicated market, which is difficult for most people to
comprehend.18
As long as there are patients with life-threatening illnesses, there is going to be a demand for
prescription drugs.19 The market for pharmaceutical drugs is “highly inelastic” and regardless of
how high drug prices rise, there will be a constant demand for life-saving drugs.20 Consequently,
when a family member or loved one is diagnosed with a life threatening disease, often there is no
time to waste and people are unlikely to sacrifice time shopping around for the best deal, nor are
they likely to sacrifice quality for a lower price. 21 Financial considerations take a back-seat and
raw human emotions take control when individuals are tasked with making life or death decisions
for their loved ones.22 Everything that economics textbooks tell us about the ordinary forces that
drive product markets, like supply and demand 23 suddenly become irrelevant and all that matters
is keeping someone alive or improving their quality of life, no matter what the cost. 24 The tough
reality is that at the end of the day, despite being part of a market that represents an economic
anomaly, pharmaceutical companies are businesses and as the centuries old decision in Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co. made clear: the foremost objective of a business is to generate profits for its
shareholders.25
Despite a unique market boasting near-inelastic demands, in the world of pharmaceuticals,
nothing happens fast, and nothing comes cheap. Developing a new drug can take ten to fifteen
years.26 Estimates suggest “that only one out of every 5,000-10,000 drugs make it to” clinical
trials,27 and only 11.83% of those drugs that make it to the clinical trial phase make it to the
market.28 Odds like these seem better suited for a Las Vegas casino, maybe suggesting why
16
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companies are willing to gamble their money with hopes of hitting a jackpot. A recent study by
Tufts University Center for the Study of Drug Development estimated the pre-approval cost of
developing a new prescription drug at nearly $2.6 billion 29 and that estimated post-approval
research and development costs can increase that number by over $400 million. 30 The level of risk
involved in developing a new drug in conjunction with the astronomical costs of research and
development justifies companies charging high prices in order to maintain profitable returns for
their investors.31
With low marginal costs after a drug is developed, why would pharmaceutical companies be
incentivized to bear the costs necessary to develop a drug only for the rest of the market to produce
it inexpensively and drive the price down?32 This is why patent33 and intellectual property laws34
are critical to the pharmaceutical industry, as they provide the incentive for companies to invest in
innovation by providing patent protection. 35 In practical effect, patent protection grants the
inventor or patent holder a “limited monopoly” for the duration of the patent and with that,
deference to the judgement of manufacturers in pricing their drugs how they see fit. 36 Because of
patent law, regardless of whether or not the general public views the prices manufacturers charge
as “morally repugnant,” they are legal.37 Another unfortunate consequence of the for-profit
prescription drug industry is the lack of incentive for companies to invest in the development of
drugs for less common “neglected conditions”38 with small patient populations, as they would not
provide the high returns sought by drug manufacturers. Despite both federal39 and state40
initiatives to help make prescription drugs more affordable, many Americans are still underinsured
and unable to afford the cost-sharing expenses41 imposed by their health plans.42
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To understand the forces that drive prescription drug prices and the cost-sharing structure
wherein PAPs fit, it is important to “demystify”43 the United States Pharmaceutical Supply Chain
and to have a general understanding of the different entities and the financial relationships that
connect them.44 Pharmaceutical manufacturers invest in the research and development necessary
to develop new drugs, produce important safety guidelines, and are the source of drugs in the
pharmaceutical supply chain. 45 Manufacturers typically distribute the drugs to wholesalers,
specialty pharmacies, government purchasers and other bulk purchasers, rarely ever selling straight
to customers.46 Aside from spending for research and development, drug manufacturers also spend
significant amounts of money on direct-to-consumer advertising.47 Such significant spending on
this consumer-targeted advertising is often purported to be “deceptive” because it allegedly takes
advantage of patients who lack the requisite knowledge to know any better than to show up at their
physician’s office and demand brand-name drugs based on testimonials from commercials. 48
Wholesale distributors purchase drugs in bulk from manufacturers, store them in warehouses
and manage distributing them to a variety of customers such as pharmacies and hospitals. 49 Over
the years, the drug wholesale industry has consolidated considerably, leaving several companies
in control of the market.50 To increase efficiency, the drug wholesale business has adapted to
provide its customers with a variety of services in addition to traditional distribution such as
handling electronic data, reimbursements and other specialized services. 51 The final step in the
pharmaceutical supply chain before drugs reach patients are pharmacies, which purchase drugs
from wholesalers and store them until they are dispensed to patients when they fill a prescription. 52
Throughout this process, PBMs work alongside the other parties to negotiate manufacturer
discounts on behalf of health plans (private insurance, employer health plans, government health
plans, etc.) and decide which drugs will be included in the insurer’s formularies—the list of drugs
they will cover.53
Even more complex than the physical supply chain for prescription drugs is the financial flow
between different parties. Wholesalers purchase drugs from manufacturers at wholesale
acquisition cost (“WAC”), which is often further discounted for things such as prompt-pay or highvolume purchases.54 Pharmacies negotiate prices with manufacturers based on the pharmacy’s
ability to sell certain volumes, and even though wholesalers distribute the drugs, the payment flows
from the pharmacy to the manufacturer. 55 If the negotiated price between the pharmacy and
manufacturer is lower than the WAC price paid by wholesalers, the wholesaler will utilize a pricing
mechanism known as a “chargeback” and the manufacturer will reimburse the wholesale
distributor for the difference in the price paid by the consumer and the WAC price paid by
43
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wholesalers.56 Somewhere in this complex chain is the PBM who contracts with health plans to
manage drug costs by negotiating discounts and rebates with manufacturers in exchange for their
drugs being included on the health plan’s formularies.57
At the end of the day, after each of these parties has had their say in the different negotiations,
there is a price tag for the drug that needs to be paid before the consumer can ultimately access
their drugs. Health insurance plays a huge role in facilitating this process by utilizing cost-sharing
methods to mitigate individual loss and “limit a consumer’s exposure to healthcare costs.” 58 In
order for the health insurance system to work, customers (patients) are responsible for their
proportionate share of the cost in the form of co-pays, deductibles, etc. With healthcare costs
increasing every year, 59 what happens when patients are unable to even afford their out-of-pocket
expenses? Enter: Patient Assistance Programs (“PAPs”).
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Exhibit 1: Flow of Goods and Financial Transactions Among Players in the U.S. Commercial
Pharmaceutical Supply Chain60

II.

60

Patient Assistance Programs
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PAPs have been considered an important “safety net” for low-income patients who do not
have health insurance or are otherwise unable to afford their medication. 61 PAPs can be structured
in different ways such as direct manufacturer PAPs62 or Independent Charity PAPs.63 Direct PAPs
are affiliated with pharmaceutical manufacturers and typically provide assistance in the form of
free or discounted drugs as well as cash subsidies directly to the patients. 64 PAPs that are offered
directly through pharmaceutical manufacturers provide patients that meet the eligibility
requirements with access to their brand name drugs at little or no out-of-pocket costs.65
Indirect Patient Assistance is offered through Independent Charitable PAPs, 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations such as Patient Advocacy or Patient Support Groups, that provide co-pay
assistance to patients of a specific disease state.66 501 (c)(3) organizations receive federal taxexempt status, and in order to qualify the organization must be “organized and operated
exclusively” for one of the purposes specified by the statute—which includes “charitable”
purposes.67 “Independent charities operate PAPs that offer aid such as financial assistance to
uninsured consumers or underinsured consumers who cannot meet their health plans’ premiums
or cost sharing, such as co- payments, coinsurance, and deductibles.”68 Pharmaceutical
manufacturers make cash donations to third party independent bona fide charities, which are
charities that support patient groups that are in line with the manufacturer’s business and
products.69 For example, a company that manufactures a drug for prostate cancer may donate to
organizations with programs that support prostate cancer patients. If properly structured, these
programs use the donations they receive to award assistance to financially needy patients in a
uniform and independent manner. The goal is to increase patient’s access to drugs in a truly
charitable manner that “severs any link between the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s funding and
the beneficiary,”70 in other words, making sure that the assistance provided cannot be directly
attributed to the manufacturers who made the donations.71
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III.

Potential Corrupt Payments and the OIG

In recent years, the United States has seen a sharp increase in pharmaceutical spending which
has led the government to more closely scrutinize drug prices as well as the relationships between
different actors in the pharmaceutical market. 72 Under the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”)
pharmaceutical manufacturers cannot provide patients with any direct or indirect financial
assistance that would subsidize their co-pays or expenses for drugs that are reimbursed by a
government insurance program such as Medicare. 73 Pursuant to the 2010 amendment to AKS,74
violations of AKS that result in a federal health care payments are per se violations of the False
Claims Act75 (“FCA”).76 The FCA has proven to be an effective tool for fighting healthcarerelated fraud by creating a public-private partnership by which “whistleblowers” can recover civil
damages on behalf of the United States government. 77
The AKS prohibits manufacturers from offering or paying, directly or indirectly, any
remuneration that would induce Medicare patients to purchase the company’s product. 78 Co-pay
requirements were included in Medicare programs partially to serve as a check on health care costs
such as the prices that pharmaceutical manufacturers can demand for their drugs. 79 The law is
clear that waving co-pays can constitute a violation of the AKS and thus the FCA. 80
The Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) of the Department of Health and Human Services
periodically develops and issues guidance to alert and inform the healthcare industry about
potential issues as well as areas of special interest and legal significance. Before the Medicare
Part D program81 was even enacted, the OIG recognized the potential for fraud and published a
Special Advisory Bulletin in 2005 assessing the potential for fraud and abuse if pharmaceutical
manufacturers offered patient assistance to Medicare Part D beneficiaries. 82 Although the OIG’s
statements were based primarily on speculation at the time they were made, they highlight the fact
that years ago, the OIG was already aware of the potential for fraud.83 In the 2005 Special
Advisory Bulletin, the OIG clearly explained that pharmaceutical manufacturer affiliated PAPs
that provided cost-sharing subsidies to Medicare Part D beneficiaries would implicate the antikickback statute and “pose a heightened risk of fraud and abuse.” 84 As a “less-abusive” alternative
to direct manufacturer PAPs, the OIG made it clear that pharmaceutical manufacturers are still
72
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able to contribute to patient assistance through donations to independent charitable PAPs, as long
as the programs were properly structured. 85
In defining what would be a “properly structured” program, the OIG provided five points
of focus for which safeguards can be employed to minimize the risk of manufacturers using
independent charity assistance programs as a vehicle to indirectly fund patients’ co-pays for their
drugs.86 First, “neither the pharmaceutical manufacturer nor any affiliate of the manufacturer
(including, without limitation, any employee, agent, officer, shareholder or contractor (including,
without limitation, any wholesaler, distributor, or pharmacy benefits manager)) [should] exert[]
any direct or indirect influence or control over the charity or the subsidy program.”87 Second, the
charity should award “assistance in a truly independent manner that severs any link between the
pharmaceutical manufacturer’s funding and the beneficiary (i.e., the assistance provided cannot be
attributed to the donating pharmaceutical manufacturer).”88 Third, the charity should award
“assistance without regard to the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s interests and without regard to
the beneficiary’s choice of product, provider, practitioner, supplier, or Part D plan.”89 The OIG
did, however, recognize that some independent patient assistance charities focus their programs
on specific disease states in order to benefit patients suffering from that type of condition (i.e.
prostate cancer or hemophilia) and have allowed donors to contribute to charities that support
patients with diseases that the company manufactures drugs to treat.90 The OIG further noted that
the fact that a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s donations are earmarked for a specific disease should
not significantly raise the risk of abuse as long as the disease categories are not so narrowly defined
to allow the donations to effectively subsidize the manufacturer’s product.91 Fourth, the charity
should provide “assistance based upon a reasonable, verifiable, and uniform measure of financial
need that is applied in a consistent manner.”92 Fifth, the pharmaceutical manufacturer should not
“solicit or receive data from the charity that would facilitate the manufacturer in correlating the
amount or frequency of its donations with the number of subsidized prescriptions for its
products.”93
In 2014, after years of being able to experience the implementation of Medicare Part D and
the problematic features of PAPs, the OIG issued a Supplemental Special Advisory Bulletin
focused specifically on Independent Charity PAPs.94 The OIG stated that the 2014 Supplement
was not meant to replace the 2005 Special Advisory Board but instead was intended to provide
additional guidance regarding independent charity PAPs in light of new risks that had been
identified in recent years.95 The 2014 Supplement expanded on the previous guidance in three
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specific areas: disease funds, eligible recipients, and donor conduct.96 The OIG called for
increased scrutiny of charity-specific disease funds in an effort to ensure they are not defined so
narrowly as to allow a donor to essentially subsidize their own products (i.e., specific stages of a
disease, specific methods of treatment or rare diseases with only one available drug). 97 The
supplement noted that disease funds “should be defined in accordance with widely recognized
clinical standards and in a manner that covers a broad spectrum of products,”98 and eligibility
should be determined “according to a reasonable, verifiable, and uniform measure of financial
need that is applied in a consistent manner.” 99 The OIG used this supplement as an opportunity to
clarify that PAPs may be limited to federal healthcare beneficiaries as long as the appropriate
eligibility criteria is met. The OIG emphasized that the cost of a particular drug, in isolation, is
not an appropriate factor for determining financial need. Generally, overly broad financial need
criteria in conjunction with narrowly defined disease funds may be evidence of the intent to cover
the co-pays of a specific drug instead of focusing on the goal of helping to fund treatment for
financially struggling patients with a specific disease.
IV.

Recent Enforcement Actions

The main concern for AKS implications lies in the potential for manufacturer donors to use
the charity PAPs as a vehicle to essentially subsidize the cost of co-payments for their own
products.100 Conduct on behalf of donors that attempts to correlate their contributions to the
support for their products actually received by patients would raise a red flag of the intent to
commit such fraud.101 In recent years, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), one of the agencies
tasked with enforcing the AKS, has entered into numerous settlements with pharmaceutical
companies in regard to anti-kickback violations due to alleged use independent patient assistance
charities as “conduits” to pay for patient’s co-pays of their drugs.102 United Therapeutics
Corporation (hereinafter “UT”) agreed to a $210 million settlement for allegedly using an
independent patient assistance foundation to pay Medicare patient’s co-pays for their hypertension
drug by not permitting Medicare beneficiaries from participating in UT’s direct free drug program
and instead referring them to the foundation. 103 Similarly, Jazz Pharmaceuticals (hereinafter
“Jazz”), manufacturer of narcolepsy drug Xyrem, agreed to pay $57 million to settle allegations
that they made Medicare patients ineligible for the company’s free drug program and instead
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referred them to a narcolepsy-focused patient assistance foundation that almost exclusively
supported Xyrem patients and was solely funded by Jazz. 104
UT and Jazz are just two examples of contributors to the over $800 million that has been
paid by pharmaceutical companies in recent years in order to resolve FCA and AKS investigations
related to patient assistance charities.105 Increased government scrutiny of the independent PAP
structure has shown that the compliance risks involved in donating to these charities make it a
high-risk activity for drug companies.106 The surge of federal government investigations along
with nearly $1 billion in settlements suggests that something is not right with this system.
V.

Defining the Problem: How PAPs Affect Drug Spending and Who is Hurt

The pharmaceutical industry is unique in the sense that unlike many other markets, the
end consumer (the patient) rarely pays anywhere near the actual cost of the product, instead that
cost is shared with either private health insurance companies or federal healthcare programs.107
Patients’ out-of-pocket expenses are typically a fraction of the drug’s total cost, and with the bulk
of payment coming from insurance or other third party payers, patients become desensitized to
drug prices because they do not pay the full price themselves.108 This structure essentially
incentivizes drug suppliers to charge higher prices 109 because insured patients are mainly
concerned with their out-of-pocket costs and co-pays110 rather than the total cost of the drugs,
which are paid by the insurance company or other third-party payor.
Advocates of PAP-provided support make the argument that if patients are unable to afford
medication to treat serious diseases, they will end up needing more expensive treatment in the
future which, in the long run will increase the cost of the healthcare system as a whole. 111 This
may be true for the rare disease for which there is only one single viable treatment option, however,
this argument is invalid when dealing with drugs that have generic equivalents. 112 PAPs may
“inhibit cost-effective medication use” and have important implications on public drug spending
by allowing patients to use higher-cost medications when there are more cost-effective options
available such as generics. 113
In order to illustrate, assume there is a branded drug that costs $10,000 and a generic
equivalent of the same drug costs $1,000. Patient “X” has health insurance that would make his
104
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out-of-pocket cost for the branded drug $500, and his out-of-pocket cost for the generic version
$5. Patient X is unable to afford the branded drug but finds an independent PAP that covers most
of his out-of-pocket costs for the branded drug. With patient X’s out-of-pocket costs for the
branded and generic drug now roughly the same, he decides to go with the branded drug. Now,
the insurance company is paying the remainder of the cost for the $10,000 branded drug, when
there was a generic alternative available for one tenth of the cost.
The Federal AKS114 exists in part to protect Medicare and the taxpayers who fund it from
overpaying for drugs and essentially “‘holding the bag for the costs of expensive drugs.’”115 In
response to recent DOJ settlements with pharmaceutical companies resolving allegations of antikickback violations regarding independent foundations, District of Massachusetts U.S. Attorney
Andrew E. Lelling explained, “This misconduct is widespread, and enforcement will continue until
pharmaceutical companies stop circumventing the anti-kickback laws to artificially bolster high
drug prices, all at the expense of the American taxpayers.” 116 Consider Medicare beneficiaries
who are unable to afford the out-of-pocket costs for expensive drugs. Instead of pharmaceutical
companies being pressured to lower drug prices, independent PAPs allow these individuals to
purchase the expensive drugs at little to no out-of-pocket cost, and Medicare is left to pay the
remainder of the drug price.117 By contributing money to independent charity PAPs in the disease
areas of their products, manufacturers allow for federal healthcare beneficiaries to minimize their
out-of-pocket costs and keep receiving the brand name drugs, ensuring the rest of the drug costs
will be reimbursed by the government. At the end of the day, American taxpayers are the ones
being affected because millions of tax dollars are potentially wasted every year by overpaying for
drugs that could be less expensive.118 When drug manufacturers support privately insured patients
with direct patient assistance and co-pay coverage, private insurance companies are left to pick up
the rest of the expensive drug costs. 119 Therefore, privately-insured patients who would otherwise
not even be able to afford their co-pays are able to get the drugs, and once again the drug
manufacturers get paid. 120 This creates further cost implications in the private insurance market
because as more patients receive assistance to obtain high priced brand-named drugs when lowercost alternatives are available, gross expenses increase for the insurance companies. 121 The most
likely response from insurance companies is then to implement cost-sharing measures by raising
the coverage rates for all patients, effectively passing on the increase in expenses they endure from
covering higher-cost drugs when less expensive generic alternatives are available. 122 PAPs can be
critical for patients who need expensive life-saving drugs with no generic substitutes. 123 When
commercially insured patients utilize co-pay assistance in order to choose higher-cost branded
drugs over available generics, the short-term out-of-pocket savings they enjoy may come at the
cost of higher long-term expenses for themselves and society as a whole. 124 Exhibit 2 below
114

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b.
United Therapeutics Agrees to Pay $210 Million, supra note 79 (quoting Acting U.S. Attorney Weinreb).
116
Three Pharmaceutical Companies Agree to Pay a Total of Over $122 Million to Resolve Allegations That They
Paid Kickbacks Through Co-Pay Assistance Foundations, supra note 102.
117
See id.
118
United Therapeutics Agrees to Pay $210 Million, supra note 79.
119
Lifesavers or Kickbacks?, supra note111.
120
See United Therapeutics Agrees to Pay $210 Million, supra note 79.
121
Joseph S. Ross & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Prescription-Drug Coupons - No Such Thing as a Free Lunch, 369 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1188, 1189 (2013).
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
115

12

illustrates that since the early 2000s, total annual healthcare spending in the U.S. has increased
drastically, reflecting steady increases in both private health insurance as well as Medicare
spending. Meanwhile, out-of-pocket costs paid by individuals remain stagnant, failing to increase
proportionately with the increases in spending.
Exhibit 2: Annual U.S. Health Care Spending 1970-2017125

One of the most puzzling aspects of the PAP “system” as a whole is that despite the
argument that they help manufacturers keep drug prices high, multiple parties in this field benefit
from the current system and there is thus little motivation to advocate for change. PAPs act as
effective public relations programs for pharmaceutical companies because when patients complain
about high drug prices, manufacturers can respond by claiming they will help out anyone who
cannot afford the drugs or point them in the direction of a charity PAP.126 Pharmaceutical
manufacturers have no reason to advocate for change because supporting PAPs gives the
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appearance that they are helping make drugs more affordable to patients, but in reality, they are
making sure that they get paid.127
For example, Mechanic Andre Rucker was diagnosed with a rare blood cancer and
struggled to afford his $500 per month co-pay for the treatment with an annual cost of $142,000,
explaining “it was a choice between covering his mortgage and paying for his cancer drug.” 128
Rucker received co-pay assistance from the Patient Access Network Foundation, an independent
PAP funded largely by drug manufacturers that has previously been investigated by the
Department of Justice for alleged fraud. 129 When discussing the criticism of PAPs, like the one
that allowed him afford his cancer medication, Rucker admitted that he has a hard time questioning
the program that helped save his life and explained that “I know it’s drug [company]-funded . . .
[B]ut without that, I wouldn’t be sitting here talking to you right now.” 130 This simple yet powerful
statement accurately illustrates the issue that despite their knowledge of the highly-criticized
relationship between drug manufacturers and PAPs, patients who accessed life-saving medication
because of these organizations are highly unlikely to turn around and accuse them of any
wrongdoing, let alone advocate for change to a system that has only benefitted them. 131 The
challenge lies in finding a way to make people understand that making drugs more affordable for
a certain group of individuals does nothing to address the bigger issues of high drug prices and
increased healthcare costs.132
Recently, the Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”) published a study that
analyzed the characteristics of independent PAPs. The study focused on six of the largest patient
charity organizations in the United States and the sub-group of 274 PAPs they maintained,
analyzing their contributions for the fiscal year 2018.133
Based on the analysis of this sub-group, drugs were covered by at least one PAP for 36% of
generic drugs “costing less than $7,200, 52% of drugs costing between $7,200 and $10,000, 73%
of specialty drugs costing between $10,000 and $30,000, and 83% of specialty drugs costing more
than $30,000.”134 PAPs were more likely to cover higher-priced specialty drugs and brand-name
drugs than less-expensive brand-name drugs and generic equivalents.135 “The exclusion of
uninsured patients from the eligibility criteria was a uniform pattern across PAPs.”136 For PAPs,
the cost of providing support to an insured patient is cheaper than covering an uninsured patient
who needs the same drug. Why? Because the insured patient likely only needs assistance with
127
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out-of-pocket expenses and will have the rest of the drug cost covered by Medicare or private
insurance.137 The most likely justification for excluding uninsured patients, is that this allows
programs to use their limited amount of funding to help the largest number of patients. 138 A
primary focus of the OIG’s 2014 Supplementary Advisory Bulletin was to reiterate that the donor
should not be able to access any information that would enable them to “correlate the amount or
frequency of its donations with the number of aid recipients who use its products or services or the
volume of those products supported by the PAP.”139 A PAP’s eligibility requirement that patients
have some form of health insurance does not directly give donors any information regarding
assistance provided for their specific product, however, the statistics published by PAPs in their
annual reports disclose exactly what percentage of funds are used to cover patient co-pays.140
For PAPs that give out almost 100% of their funds in the form of co-pay assistance, this
indirectly lets manufacturers know that nearly all of the PAP’s contributions will be used to pay
co-pays for patients whose drug costs will be covered by insurance, and also provides data that,
depending on the specific PAP, could be utilized to make rough estimates of which products
patients receive assistance.141 The findings that show a higher percentage of PAP coverage of
specialty or brand-name drugs as opposed to generics, supports the argument that PAPs encourage
physicians and patients to choose specialty or brand-name treatments.142 Even though these
treatment options are likely to be much more expensive in total cost, despite the availability of
lower cost generics, the higher likelihood of available co-pay assistance from PAPs means that the
specialty and brand-name drugs may have the lowest out-of-pocket costs for patients. 143
In an editorial accompanying the JAMA study, Katherine Kraschel, JD, of Yale Law School,
and Gregory Curfman, MD, of JAMA, claimed that the findings questioned the role of PAPs as
charitable organizations and further noted that:
By preferring patients with insurance (which must cover the patient’s specific
drug), the nonprofit [PAPs] maximize payments to the for-profit pharmaceutical
companies that fund them. The findings also illustrate the way PAPs drive up health
care costs by providing support for more expensive specialty drugs in lieu of less
expensive alternatives. In sum, these new results show that PAPs provide assistance
to a narrow, insured patient population to the benefit of the pharmaceutical
companies.144
This analysis highlights that the relationship between PAPs and pharmaceutical manufacturers
may not be as straightforward and altruistic as it appears. The complexity of this relationship can
potentially allow a seemingly charitable arrangement to advance the underlying financial motives
of the pharmaceutical companies that fund them.
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VI.

Recent State Legislation Attempts and Why They Fell Short

Although no federal regulation expressly prohibits direct manufacture patient assistance to
federal health care beneficiaries, the OIG guidance made it clear that such support would be subject
to strict scrutiny, leading manufacturers to exclude Medicare beneficiaries from their assistance
programs.145 Despite shying away from supporting federal healthcare beneficiaries, manufacturers
continue to offer co-pay assistance to privately insured patients. 146 In efforts to lower drug costs
by promoting the use of generics, California enacted legislation in 2018 which prohibits
manufacturers of brand name drugs from providing co-pay assistance to patients for drugs that fall
into one of two categories.147 The first category is drugs for which a lower cost generic drug that
has been designated as a therapeutic equivalent by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is
available and is covered under the patient’s health insurance plan.148 The second category is drugs
that have active ingredients that are contained in products that are approved by the FDA and
available without prescription at a lower cost and are not otherwise contraindicated for the
treatment of the condition for which the prescription drug is approved.149 Yet, the California law
“does not prohibit or limit assistance to a patient provided by an independent charity PAP.”150
Similarly, Massachusetts anti-kickback law includes provisions that limit drug
manufacturer co-pay assistance stating, “[p]harmaceutical manufacturing companies shall be
prohibited from offering any discount, rebate, product voucher or other reduction in an individual’s
out-of-pocket expenses, including co-payments and deductibles, for any prescription drug that has
an AB rated generic equivalent as determined by the United States Food and Drug
Administration.”151 Unlike the California Law, the Massachusetts statute applies not only to drugs
paid for by government healthcare programs but extends to drugs paid for by any insurer which
includes private health insurance. 152 The Massachusetts statute only applies to direct patient
assistance and does not extend to restrict the provision of co-pay assistance through independent
PAPs.153
Neither of these laws include any restrictions on contributions to independent patient assistance
foundations.154 Manufacturers already stay away from providing direct patient assistance to
Medicare beneficiaries for fear of anti-kickback violations and creating laws to limit direct patient
assistance to privately insured patients is unlikely to fix this problem. 155 With statutes like these
in effect, rather than cut off all patient assistance spending, it is more likely that manufacturers
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will instead redirect their financial assistance in the form of support to charitable patient assistance
foundations that are consistent with federal and state requirements. 156
VII.

Possible Federal Legislative Approaches

One of the challenges with using state legislation to tackle rising drug prices is that different
laws must be enacted over time by each individual state. Not only could this be time consuming
given that any proposed laws would have to pass through each state’s legislative process, but it
could potentially present issues in consistency, as each state’s laws would likely be different.
Perhaps most pertinent is the fact that any change in drug prices due to state legislation would lack
the immediate and large-scale effects that would come with federal legislation. Although greater
in scope, designing federal legislation to lower drug prices presents its own challenges.
For example, in 2019, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi introduced the “Lower Drug Costs Now
Act,” a proposed federal approach to lowering drug prices that was met with fierce opposition by
drug manufacturers and industry experts.157 Among other things, the Act would force drug
manufacturers who raised prices in excess of “inflation since 2016 to either reverse the price or
rebate the amount of the increase to the federal government.”158 Manufacturers of the limited
group of drugs chosen for the program would essentially be forced to accept a “maximum fair
price” determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, or be subjected to up to a 95%
sales tax.159 The act does not expressly make reference to PAPs, but it does explain that the
maximum fair price would be the exact price patients pay at the pharmacy, making it unlikely that
any further discounts would be allowed for those drugs.160 Although a federal legislative approach
to drug pricing might be a step in the right direction, the fact that this proposed law would apply
only to a select group of drugs fails to provide consistency, as the benefits are limited to those
patients who need the drugs chosen to be included in the program. As highlighted earlier, making
specific drugs more affordable for specific groups of people is merely a crutch and fails to address
the bigger issue why the drug prices are as high as they are. 161 With regard to the drugs not
included in the proposed law, patients, health insurers and the government are left to deal with the
patient assistance problem.
The issue that is drawing the most opposition and will likely cause this bill to fail illustrates
perhaps the greatest challenge in designing a federal law to lower drug prices: maintaining balance
between lowering prices and still encouraging medical innovation. 162 By putting manufacturers in
a gun-to-the-head situation to either accept the governments price or pay unrealistic tax penalties,
a rigid structure like this is likely to decrease research and development spending and result in less
life-saving drugs from reaching the market.163 In fact, the Council of Economic Advisors estimates
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that if passed, the Lower Drug Costs Now Act could lead to as many as one hundred fewer drugs
entering the U.S. market over the next decade and a decrease in national life expectancy.164
Perhaps a better solution would be a federal law that makes it illegal for any drug manufacturer
PAP or independent charity PAP to provide co-pay assistance towards drugs for which there is an
FDA approved generic equivalent. If the prices for these drugs remained so economically
discriminatory to the extent that patients are unable to afford the co-pays for the drug without
assistance, it is likely that more generics would be utilized and the healthcare system as a whole
would see a decrease in spending. What becomes of the manufacturers and their high drug prices?
With patients having to choose medication based on more realistic financial considerations, lowercost alternatives will hopefully begin to push the overpriced branded drugs out of the market.
Ideally this would allow normal economic factors 165 to come into play and force the prices to lower
naturally over time, as opposed to a drastic and artificial decrease like what was proposed in the
Lower Drug Costs Now Act.166
VIII. Conclusion
The drug pricing crisis in the United States is real; health care costs are continuing to rise and
show no sign of slowing down anytime soon. 167 As this paper hopefully reflected, there are a great
deal of moving parts in the U.S. prescription drug market and the economics behind drug prices
are truly enigmatic. If nothing is done to fix this crisis, drug prices and healthcare spending will
continue to keep rising until what . . . ? For now, that ending remains unknown. One thing,
however, we can know for sure—there is a patient assistance problem.
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